Não foi possível enviar o arquivo. Será algum problema com as permissões?
Diferenças
Aqui você vê as diferenças entre duas revisões dessa página.
Ambos lados da revisão anterior Revisão anterior Próxima revisão | Revisão anterior Próxima revisão Ambos lados da revisão seguinte | ||
pessoais:pedro:ler [2007/02/06 15:28] pedro |
pessoais:pedro:ler [2007/05/31 18:12] pedro |
||
---|---|---|---|
Linha 1: | Linha 1: | ||
==== Assuntos ==== | ==== Assuntos ==== | ||
spatial equilibrium models | spatial equilibrium models | ||
+ | |||
==== Papers==== | ==== Papers==== | ||
Linha 260: | Linha 261: | ||
if it is not series-parallel. More generally, Pareto inefficient equilibria occur in a network if and only if one | if it is not series-parallel. More generally, Pareto inefficient equilibria occur in a network if and only if one | ||
of three simple networks is embedded in it.// | of three simple networks is embedded in it.// | ||
- | |||
- | ===A random matching theory=== | ||
- | [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/geb/aliprantis_random_matching_06.pdf|C.D. Aliprantis and G. Camera and D. Puzzellob, 2006]] | ||
- | |||
- | //We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics | ||
- | of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions. | ||
- | A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational | ||
- | constraints.// | ||
===Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence=== | ===Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence=== | ||
Linha 535: | Linha 528: | ||
+ | ===Spatial Games with Adaptive Tit-for-Tats=== | ||
+ | [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/tzafestas00.pdf|E. S. Tzafestas, 2000]] | ||
+ | //This paper presents an adaptive tit-for-tat strategy and a study of its | ||
+ | behavior in spatial IPD games. The adaptive tit-for-tat strategy is shown | ||
+ | elsewhere to demonstrate high performance in IPD tournaments or individual | ||
+ | IPD games with other types of strategies, and obtains higher scores than the | ||
+ | pure tit-for-tat strategy. In spatial IPD games, the strategy exhibits stability and | ||
+ | resistance to perturbations, and those properties are more pronounced in | ||
+ | variations of the spatial game model that induce some degree of “noise” : | ||
+ | probabilistic winning, spatial irregularity and continuous time. The adaptive tit- | ||
+ | for-tat strategy is also compared to pure tit-for-tat and found to be more stable | ||
+ | and predominant in perturbed environments.// | ||
Linha 559: | Linha 563: | ||
==== Pages ==== | ==== Pages ==== | ||
CASA - Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis (http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/news/index.htm). | CASA - Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis (http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/news/index.htm). | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard University) | ||
==== Authors ==== | ==== Authors ==== | ||
Linha 574: | Linha 581: | ||
with **Hebert Gintis**: [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/bowles_inheritance_of_inequality.pdf|The inheritance of inequality]], 2002 | with **Hebert Gintis**: [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/bowles_inheritance_of_inequality.pdf|The inheritance of inequality]], 2002 | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Portugali e Benenson=== | ||
+ | Segregação |